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Abstract
This paper proposes an empirical framework to study the effects of a policy regime change
defined as an unpredictable and permanent change in the policy parameters. In particular I
show how to make conditional forecast and perform impulse response functions and counter-
factual analysis. As an application, the effects of changes in fiscal policy rules in the US are
investigated. I find that discretionary fiscal policy has become more countercyclical over the
last decades. In absence of such a change, surplus would have been higher, debt lower and out-
put gap more volatile but only until mid 80s. An increase in the degree of counter-cyclicality
of fiscal policy has a positive effect on output gap in periods where the level of debt-to-GDP
ratio is low and a zero or negative effect when the ratio is high. This explains why a more
countercylical stance of the systematic fiscal policy taking place in 2008:II is predicted to be
rather ineffective for recovering from the crisis.
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1 Introduction
What are the effects of policy regime changes? Answering this question is the center-
piece of policy analysis but has proven to be a difficult task. Typically in empirical
macro-models a policy regime is associated to a parameter, or a set of parameters, of a
function describing the behavior of the policy makers, i.e. the policy rule (Taylor, 1999).
A regime change is represented by a shift in such parameters. The difficulty of assessing
the consequences of regime shifts arises from the well-known observation (Lucas, 1976)
that in empirical models the parameters of the remaining non-policy equations are not
policy invariant. Neglecting such relations is likely to yield to misleading predictions
about the effects of the policy shift.1
This paper proposes an empirical framework to study the effects of policy regime
changes.2 The empirical model is a reduced form VAR. The reduced form parame-
ters are functions of policy and potentially other non-policy structural time-varying
parameters. The key ingredient of our procedure is the identification of the parameters
representing the policy regime. Once identification is achieved, a policy regime shift is
defined as an unpredictable and permanent change, i.e. a shock, in these parameters.
Identification has a crucial implication: the correlations between policy parameters
and the remaining reduced form parameters are also identified. Therefore variations
in non-policy parameters following the regime shift are taken into account making our
procedure not subject to criticism mentioned above.
I apply this methodology to fiscal policy rules. While a great deal of attention has
been paid on changes in monetary policy (see e.g. the seminal paper Clarida Gali and
Gertler, 2000, or Lubik and Schorfheide, 2004) there is little evidence documenting
changes in fiscal policy rules (see Favero and Monacelli, 2005, and Taylor, 2000, Davig
and Leeper, 2006, and Chung, Davig and Leeper, 2007). But most importantly there
is even less devoted to document the macroeconomic consequences of such changes.
Here I investigate the effects of fiscal policy regime changes with special attention to
the systematic response of the cyclically adjusted surplus to output gap, the coefficient
representing the degree of counter-cyclicality of discretionary fiscal policy.
I find that discretionary fiscal policy has become more countercyclical over the last
decades. This change has substantially increased the level of debt to GDP ratio, the
1Benati (2010) shows that the bias in the results can be substantial.
2An alternative framework has been proposed by Leeper and Zha (2002).
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deficit and, to a lesser extent and only in specific periods of time, stabilized economic
activity. An increase in the degree of counter-cyclicality of fiscal policy has a positive
effect on output gap in periods where the level of debt-to-GDP ratio is low and a zero
or negative effect when the ratio is high. This seems to explain why I find that a more
countercyclical stance of the systematic fiscal policy taking place in 2008:II is predicted
to be rather ineffective for recovering from the crisis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the econo-
metric framework; section 3 discuss an application to the US fiscal policy; section 4
concludes.
2 The econometric framework
2.1 The model
Here I discuss the assumptions underlying our econometric procedure.
A1) A n-dimensional vector of economic variables yt satisfies
yt = Xtθ(γt) + εt (1)
where Xt = (In ⊗ xt), with xt = [y′t−1 ...y′t−p], εt is a Gaussian white noise vector with
covariance matrix Rt, γt is a q-dimensional vector including policy and possibly other
structural non-policy coefficients, with q ≤ n2p+n, and θt(γt) is a n2p+n-dimensional
vector of reduced form coefficients which are functions of the structural ones.
A2) The structural coefficients evolve smoothly and in a unpredictable way, i.e.
γt = γt−1 + ut (2)
where ut is a q-dimensional Gaussian white noise vector with identity covariance matrix
and uncorrelated with εt. I assume that there are r < q policy coefficients collected
in the subvector γ¯t of γt and the corresponding policy shocks are collected in the
subvector u¯t of ut. Conditional on the information available at time t the current
regime is expected to be in place in the future. Policy regime changes in the economy
occur unexpectedly, i.e. are shocks, and are permanent, i.e. the regime is not expected
to revert back.
A3) The elements of θt are linear functions of γt,
θt ≡ θ(γt) = Aγt
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where A is a n2p+n× q left invertible matrix, that is there exists a q×n2p+n matrix
A˜ such that A˜A = Iq. Notice that when policy changes all the reduced form coefficients
can change. Linearity is a somewhat restrictive assumption but has the advantage that
it dramatically simplifies the analysis.
Assumptions A2) and A3) imply the following law of motion for θt
θt = θt−1 + et (3)
where et = Aut with covariance matrix AA
′ = Q. Equations (1) and (3) form the Time-
Varying Coefficients model proposed by Cogley and Sargent (2001, 2005) and recently
used in many applications3. The only difference is that Q can be singular, that is
the number of sources of variations in the economy can be smaller than the number
of reduced-form coefficients. Using the estimation techniques in Cogley and Sargent
(2005), Primiceri (2006) or deWind and Gambetti (2010) for the case q < n2p+ n, the
posterior distribution of all the model parameters can be characterized.
Consider the following decomposition Q = V ΛV ′ where Λ is the q × q diagonal
matrix whose diagonal elements are the nonzero eigenvalues of Q and V the n2p+n×q
matrix formed by the corresponding eigenvalues. Equation (3) can be rewritten as
θt = θt + V Λ
1/2vt
where vt is a Gaussian white noise vector with identity covariance matrix. Now, let H
be any orthogonal q × q matrix. Therefore
θt = θt + V Λ
1/2Hut
where ut = H
′vt = A˜et with A˜ = H ′Λ−1/2V ′. To identify ut q(q − 1)/2 restrictions
have to be placed on H. To identify the vector of policy shocks u¯t only r columns of
H have to be fixed. Call Hr the n
2p + n × r matrix formed by such columns. The
vector of policy shocks and related parameters can be found as u¯t = H
′
rΛ
−1/2V ′et,
γ¯t = H
′
rΛ
−1/2V ′θt
Identifying policy changes is not an easy task. The idea is that information about
the relations between structural and reduced form coefficients or the effects (see below)
of some policy change on some variables should be used to fix the elements in Hr. A
simple case is when the policy coefficient coincides with a reduced form coefficient. In
3See Gali and Gambnetti (2009) and Primiceri (2005) among many others.
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this case the scalar γ¯t coincides with the element θjt for some j and identification is
achieved by imposing Aji = 0 for j 6= i and Ajj = 1.
2.2 Policy analysis
Our objective is to study, using the model illustrated above, the effects of a policy
regime change. I define a particular policy change occurring at time t as u¯∗t . The
resulting value of the policy parameter vector following the change will be
γ¯∗t = γ¯t−1 + u¯
∗
t .
The probability distribution of ut will provide information about how likely, given
the history of data, is the policy change. Although in principle any change can be
implemented, data will be more informative about policy changes that have occurred
in the past or are not too unlikely to occur.
I will discuss three types of analysis that can be conducted within our setup condi-
tional on a policy change. Forecasting, impulse response functions and counterfactuals.
2.2.1 Conditional forecasting
Conditional forecasting analysis is designed to address the following question: given
the knowledge of the economy at time t− 1 what is the predicted path of future time
series conditional on the policy regime change (u¯∗t )? Mathematically the answer to this
question corresponds to the conditional expectation
yt+k|t−1 = E(yt+k|u¯∗t , It−1), k = 0, 1, ... (4)
where It−1 is the information set available at time t − 1. The information set can
include yt−1, so that 4 is the mean of the multivariate conditional forecast density, or
it can include also the coefficients (random variables) at that time. In this second case
4 is a random vector itself and the point estimate of the conditional forecast will be
the mean of this vector.
2.2.2 Impulse response functions
Impulse response functions analysis is designed to address the following question: what
are the dynamic effects on future time series of a the policy regime change (u¯∗t )? The
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difference with conditional forecast is that in this case the behavior of yt+k conditional
on u¯∗t is evaluated with respect to a baseline value. I define impulse response functions
as the difference in two conditional expectations differing for the information set. The
former includes the policy change the latter (the baseline case) does not. Formally
IRt+k = E(yt+k|u¯∗t , It−1)− E(yt+k|It−1), k = 0, 1, ... (5)
Notice that the impulse response functions coincide with the generalized impulse re-
sponse functions described in Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996). Unlike the responses
to additive VAR shocks the responses of shocks to policy coefficients are nonlinear: the
shape of the impulse response depends on the size and the sign of the shock. Moreover
it is easy to show that impulse response functions also depend on the level of economic
variable at the time preceding the shock. For instance, for k = 0, IRt = XtV Λ
1/2Hr.
2.2.3 Counterfactuals
Policy counterfactual exercises investigate what would have been the path of economic
variables under a policy scenario different from the actual one. The standard counter-
factual exercises within structural VAR work as follows. The model is estimated, then
the relevant policy parameters are changed and a new vector of time series is computed
using the estimated residuals. The problem with this procedure, which is an illustration
of the Lucas critique, is that typically the parameters of the other equations are not
policy invariant. This is evident in our framework where all the elements of θt depend
on γ¯t. Neglecting these correlations is likely to yield completely misleading results.
On the contrary our setup allows us to run policy counterfactuals where dependen-
cies between policy and other reduced form parameters are properly taken into account.
Suppose the sequence of policy shock {u¯t}Tt=1 for a sample of length T has been iden-
tified. Consider a particular sequence of policy changes {u¯∗t }Tt=1. Define u∗t the vector
of structural shocks where u¯t = u¯
∗
t and define γ
∗
t the vector of structural parameters
where γ¯t = γ¯
∗
t and θ
∗
t = Aγ
∗
t . The counterfactual path for yt is represented by the
sequence {y∗t }Tt=1 computed using {θ∗t }Tt=1. Notice that in this case, unlike in standard
counterfactuals, all the reduced form coefficients will change in a way consistent with
the policy change.
Notice that counterfactual exercises can be performed for any function of the coef-
ficients, f(θt) like variances, persistence and so on simply using f(θ
∗
t ).
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2.3 Computations
Here I describe how to compute the quantities of interests described above. I assume
that the posterior distribution of the coefficients is available and that the shocks have
been identified. Clarifying the notation, for any parameters a I define aj a draw from
the joint posterior distribution.
Conditional forecasts in (4) can be computed as follows.
1. Draw θjt−1, Q
j and compute V j and Λj . Draw Hr according the the identification
scheme adopted and arbitrarily fix the other column of H, say H−r, in such a
way that orthogonality is satisfied.
2. Draw a (q − r)-dimensional Gaussian white noise vector νmt and compute
θj,mt = θ
j
t−1 + V
j(Λj)1/2Hjr u¯
∗
t + V
j(Λj)1/2Hrν
m
t
3. Compute yj,mt|t−1 = Xtθ
j,m
t .
4
4. Draw emt+1 from a Normal with zero mean and covariance Q
j and compute
θj,mt+1 = θ
j,m
t + e
m
t+1
5. Form Xj,mt+1 using y
j,m
t and compute y
j,m
t+1|t−1 = X
j,m
t+1θ
j,m
t+1.
6. Repeat steps 4-5 for all the forecasting horizons K obtaining at each step yj,mt+k|t−1
for k = 1, ...,K.
7. Repeat steps 3-6 M times and compute the averages for every forecasting horizon
k = 0, ...,K
yjt+k|t−1 = 1/M
M∑
m=1
yj,mt+k.
This is a realization of the random variable (4).
8. Repeating steps 1-7 J times the percentiles of interest of the distribution of the
counterfactuals can be obtained.
To obtain the impulse response functions the second expectation in (5) has to be com-
puted. To do that the algorithm is the same as the one above but with step 2 replaced
by the following step
4The ε’s can be disregarded since they are independent from the shock in the coefficients.
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2′ Draw mt from a Normal with zero mean and covariance Qj and compute
θj,mt = θ
j
t−1 + e
m
t
The draw obtained in such a way is a realization of the random variable E(yt+k|It−1).
The difference between the realizations obtained in the two algorithms is a realization
of the impulse response functions.
To compute the counterfactuals let us proceed as follows.
i. Draw θj1, Q
j and compute V j and Λj ; draw Hr according the the identification
scheme adopted and arbitrarily fix the other column of H, say H−r in such a way
that matrix orthogonality is satisfied; compute νt = (H
j
−r)′(Λ1/2,j)−1(V j)′et.
ii. Set θ∗1 = θ1, and iterate on
θj∗t = θ
j∗
t−1 + V
jΛ1/2,jHjr u¯
∗
t + V
jΛ1/2,jHjrνt
for t = 2, ..., T .
iii. Compute the residuals εjt = yt −Xtθjt for t = 1, ..., T .
iv. Compute yj∗t = X∗t θ
j∗
t + ε
j
t for t = 1, ..., T where X
∗
1 = X1 while for t = 2, ..., T
X∗t includes the lags of y
j∗
t .
v. The sequence {y∗t }Tt=2 is a realization of the vector of counterfactual series.
vi. Repeating steps i-v J times the percentiles of interest of the distribution of the
counterfactuals can be obtained.
3 An application to fiscal policy
I apply the econometric procedure described above to fiscal policy rules.
Let yt = [st gt bt]
′ where st is the cyclically adjusted surplus-to-GDP ratio, gt is the
ouput gap and bt is the debt-to-GDP ratio. Data are U.S. quarterly data spanning from
1959:I-2008:IV. I set p = 1, q = n2p+ n and estimate model (1) (3) using the MCMC
method described in Primiceri (2005). The outcome of the estimation procedure is a
collection of 700 draws for all the model coefficients.
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3.1 A preliminary assessment
Consider the first equation of the model
st = θ1(γ¯t) + θ2(γ¯t)st−1 + θ3(γ¯t)gt−1 + θ1(γ¯t)bt−1 + ε1t
Such an equation is a time-varying parameters version of the fiscal policy rule considered
in Gali and Perotti,(2003)5 and describes how discretionary systematic fiscal policy is
conducted. ε1t represents the non-systematic component while st − ε1t the systematic
component of the rule, that is how fiscal authorities set deficit in response to changes
in output gap θ3(γ¯t) and debt θ4(γ¯t) and the degree of inertia θ2(γ¯t) . I assume that
the fiscal rule parameters depend only on structural policy parameters γ¯t.
Figure 1 plots the evolution of the coefficients θ3(γ¯t), θ4(γ¯t) and θ3(γ¯t)/(1− θ1(γ¯t))
θ4(γ¯t)/(1 − θ1(γ¯t)) where the last two represent the long run response of surplus to
output gap and debt respectively. Two results are worth noting. First, fiscal policy
has become more countercyclical, θ3(γ¯t) has increased consistently with the evidence
reported in Auerbach (2002) and Taylor (2000). Second, it has become less reactive to
the level of debt, θ4(γ¯t) has fallen.
To evaluate the implications of these policy changes I perform the following exercise.
I generate a new artificial economy under the constraint that the parameters of the fiscal
rule remain at the level observed at the beginning of the sample. That is I assume that
γ¯t = 0 for all t = 2, 3, .... In practice γ¯t is assumed to be a 4-dimensional vector
including the first four element of γt = S
−1θt where S is the Cholesky factor of Ω.
Notice that for this specific exercise the results are invariant to the particular ordering
of the elements of γ¯t.
For sake of comparison, first of all I perform the exercise in the classical way where
correlations among the parameters are neglected. In practice the fiscal rule parameters
are kept constant at the initial value and the estimated values of the remaining coeffi-
cients are used to generate the new series. Figure 1 shows the three original variables
and the counterfactual series obtained. The counterfactual predicts higher surplus,
lower output gap and lower debt over the whole sample. From a quantitative point of
view differences are large for all the variables. Quite striking is the result for debt. Had
fiscal policy rule remained as in 1965, debt in 2008 would be around 20% instead of
5Such a rule is adopted also in Andres and Domenech, and Taylor, . Debt is included following
Bohn (1998).
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60%. Based on these results I would conclude in favor of a very important role played
by change in the coefficients.
Second, I perform the same type of counterfactual using the procedure described
in section 2.2.3. Figure 2 shows the original data and the series obtained by running
the counterfactual. In this case I draw the non-policy coefficients conditional on the
policy parameters being constant over the whole sample. In other words conditioning
on a realization equal to zero of u¯∗t for t = 2, 3, .... Differences with the previous case
are striking. Deviations from the actual series are much smaller than in the previous
case. Depending on the specific year, counterfactual surplus and output gap are higher
or lower than actual ones and conterfactual debt is around 40%-50%, smaller than
the actual one but much higher than that predicted in the previous counterfactual.
Changes in the fiscal policy rule turn out to be less relevant than those estimated in
the previous counterfactual.
Table 1 shows reduced form parameters correlations. Correlations are non-zero
both within equation and across equations. Disregarding these correlations affects the
results. This explains the difference with the previous conuterfactual
3.2 The effects of countercyclical systematic fiscal policy
Next I focus on the macroeconomic effects of changes in the extent to which the sys-
tematic fiscal policy responds to output gap. That is what happens when fiscal policy
becomes more (less) countercyclical?
Policy parameter identification is reached by assuming that the parameter on output
gap in the surplus equation is a structural parameter that represents the fiscal authority
preferences about stabilization goals. Formally θ3(γt) = γ¯1,t (the first element of γ¯t)
where γ¯1,t is the structural parameter representing the fiscal authorities stabilization
preferences. An increase (fall) in the parameter means that the discretionary policy
becomes more (less) countercyclical. This assumption identifies the policy parameter
whose effects are investigated. In fact the restrictions implies that u¯1,t = e3,t. I do not
make any assumption about the other parameters.
I perform the three types of analysis described above.
3.2.1 Counterfactuals
I run three counterfactual experiments.
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The first aims at assessing the historical effects of changes in the systematic response
of fiscal policy to output gap. To do that I generate an artificial economy where the
policy parameter remains constant at the initial value. Specifically I generate three
series assuming no change in θ3(γ¯1,t), that is I set u¯
∗
1,t = 0 or equivalently γ¯1,t = γ¯1,1
for all t = 2, 3, .... Figure 4 shows the three original series (solid lines), the three
counterfactual (dotted lines) series. For sake of comparison the counterfactual series
(dashed-dotted lines) obtained ignoring correlations are also reported. Counterfactual
surplus is higher during the 80s and the 90s, while slightly lower at the beginning of the
new millennium. Counterfactual gap is slightly lower during the 80s and after mid 90s
although the differences are quantitatively small. The biggest difference is observed for
debt. Having the response of fiscal policy to output gap remained constant at the 1965
value, the debt would have been about 20% of GDP less than the actual one after mid
80s. Overall changes towards a more countercyclical policy seem to have substantially
increased deficit and public debt with limited gains in terms of output gap.
In the second countefactual I generate an economy where fiscal policy is perfectly
acyclical, that is u¯∗1,2 = −γ¯1,1 and u¯∗1,t = 0 for t = 3, 4, ... such that γ¯1,t = 0 for
t = 2, ..., T . Figure 5 shows the results. Results are almost identical to the previous
case. Had an acyclical policy been implemented over all the sample, public surplus
would have been substantially higher and debt substantially lower and output gap
slightly lower.
In the last exercise I simulate an economy where γ¯1,t reaches the maximal level
observed over the sample in period two and it remains at that level until the end of the
sample. That is u¯∗1,2 = γ¯1,60 − γ¯1,1 and u¯∗1,t = 0 for t = 3, 4, ... such that γ¯1,t = γ¯1,60
for t = 2, ..., T . The idea here is to generate an economy under a more countercyclical
policy. Results are shown in Figure 6. The counterfactual series overlap the original
ones except for few years around the 70s. A more countercyclical policy would have
had no very little effects on the three variables.
Figure 7 plots the actual (solid line) and the counterfactual variances of the output
gap.6 Before mid 90 the more countercyclical the response of fiscal authorities to output
gap the smaller the variance. In absence of the observed policy the output gap variance
6The variance is computed using the companion form of the VAR. In one case it is computed using
the actual coefficients {θt}Tt=1, while in the counterfactual cases is computed using the counterfactual
coefficients {θ∗t }Tt=1.
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would have been about 15% higher. Over such a period of time systematic discretionary
fiscal policy is stabilizing. After early 90 results are more difficult to interpret in part
because of several missing points7 but seem to suggest the opposite.
3.2.2 Impulse response functions
Figure 7 plots the impulse response functions of the three variables to an unexpected
increase in the degree of counter-cyclicality of systematic fiscal policy, a positive shock
u¯∗t , of dimension two standard deviations for every period of the sample. The dotted
lines refers to the effects at an horizon of one year, the solid lines to an horizon of two
years.
Changes in the responses of the three variables are evident. Until early 80s the
shock, at an horizon of two years, tends to reduce the surplus increasing output gap
with little effects of public debt. After mid 80s there are two big changes. First, the
sign of the response of output gap changes sign becoming negative; second the shock
increases public debt substantially.
Why the responses have changed? Figure 8 plots the response of output gap (solid
lines left scale) and the level of debt-to-GDP ratio (dotted lines right scale). The two
series are negatively correlated and the switch in the sign of the response of output gap
occurs in the first half of the 80s precisely when the debt takes off. After that date, in a
regime of high debt, a shift towards a more countercyclical policy yields a reduction of
the output gap. The results in this subsection, along with those in the previous section
seem to point to the level of debt as very relevant in terms of transmission mechanisms
of fiscal policy actions a finding which has been already documented in literature (see
Bertola and Drazen, 1993, Perotti 1999, Sutherland 1997, and Gordon and Leeper,
2005). The point is that agents expectations about future taxes are likely to depend
on the level of debt and this can generate very different dynamics for fiscal shocks.
3.2.3 Forecast
Finally the forecast for the three variables conditional on a one-standard deviation
positive shock in upt occurring in 2008:II are obtained. Figure 8 plots the results. The
solid lines are the three series. The dashed lines are the unconditional forecasts while
7Missing point refer to periods of time were the roots of the VAR polynomial are larger or equal to
one so that the formula cannot be used to compute the variance
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the dotted lines are the conditional forecasts made using (4). The two forecast are
very similar. If any, the difference is that a more countercyclical policy would induce
the perverse effect of a worsening of both surplus and debt and at the same time a
reduction of the output gap. This is consistent with the evidence presented in the
previous subsection.
4 Conclusions
This paper proposes an econometric framework to evaluate the effects of policy regimes
change. The methodology models the correlation structure between policy and non-
policy coefficients in such a way that after a policy regime change non-policy coefficients
are allowed to change accordingly.
I apply the procedure to fiscal policy rules. The main findings are: (i) discretionary
fiscal policy has become more countercyclical; (ii) the change has substantially increased
the level of debt to GDP ratio, the deficit and to a lesser extent and in specific periods
of time stabilized the output gap; (iii) the effects on output gap of the increase in the
degree of countercyclicality of fiscal policy depend on the level of debt-to-GDP ratio:
positive in periods where the ratio is low and zero or negative when the ratio is high;
(iv) a more countercylical stance of the systematic fiscal policy in 2008:II turns out to
be ineffective to recover from the last crisis.
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Tables
Table 1: Correlations uj , ui
Eq. dt gt bt
ui c dt−1 gt−1 bt−1 c dt−1 gt−1 bt−1 c dt−1 gt−1 bt−1
dt c 1
dt−1 0.36 1
gt−1 -0.05 0.54 1
bt−1 -0.99 -0.42 0.03 1
gt c 0.01 0.23 0.15 -0.03 1
dt−1 0.20 0.13 0.10 -0.21 0.42 1
gt−1 0.16 -0.02 -0.11 -0.16 -0.07 0.47 1
bt−1 -0.02 -0.24 -0.15 0.04 -0.99 -0.49 0.05 1
bt c -0.04 -0.13 -0.08 0.04 -0.78 -0.34 0.07 0.78 1
dt−1 -0.22 -0.16 -0.11 0.23 -0.37 -0.87 -0.40 0.43 0.44 1
gt−1 -0.23 -0.09 -0.02 0.22 -0.01 -0.47 -0.81 0.03 0.00 0.55 1
bt−1 0.05 0.14 0.08 -0.06 0.78 0.40 -0.06 -0.78 -0.99 -0.51 -0.02 1
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Figures
Figure1: Estimated parameters of the policy rule. Solid line are median dotted line are
68% confidence bands.
17
Figure2: Standard counterfactual neglecting correlations. Solid lines are original series,
dotted lines are counterfactual series.
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Figure3: Counterfactual using our method. Solid lines are original series, dotted lines
are counterfactual series.
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Figure 4: Counterfactual 1. Solid lines are original series; dotted lines are counterfactual
series; dashed-dotted lines are counterfactual series obtained with the standard method
that neglect correlations.
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Figure 5: Counterfactual 2. Solid lines are original series; dotted lines are counterfactual
series; dashed-dotted lines are counterfactual series obtained with the standard method
that neglect correlations.
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Figure 6: Counterfactual 3. Solid lines are original series; dotted lines are counterfactual
series; dashed-dotted lines are counterfactual series obtained with the standard method
that neglect correlations.
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Figure 7: path for the coefficient γ¯1t. Solid line is the estimated coefficient; doted line
is counterfactual path for the coefficient.
23
Figure 8: variances. Top panel plots the estimated variance (solid line) and the vari-
ance obtained in Counterfactual 1 (dotted line ), Counterfactual 2 (dashed line) and
Counterfactual 3 (dashed-dotted line). In the bottom panel the percentage gain (posi-
tive numbers) or loss (negative number) in terms of variance respect to real case in the
three counterfactuals are plotted.
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Figure 9: Impulse response functions on impact (dotted), 4 quarters (dashed line) and
8 quarters (solid line).
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Figure 10: Impulse response functions for output gap (solid left scale) and the level of
debt-to-GDP ratio (right scale).
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Figure 10: Forecast. Unconditional (solid line) and conditional (dotted line).
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